We revisit the relationship between market power and …rms' investment incentives in a noncooperative di¤erential oligopoly game in which …rms sell di¤erentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.
Introduction
The acquired industrial organization approach to the bearings of market power on the size and pace of technical progress can be traced back to the indirect debate between Schumpeter (1934 Schumpeter ( , 1942 and Arrow (1962) on the socalled Schumpeterian hypothesis, which, in a nutshell, says that one should expect to see a direct relationship between innovation and market power or industry concentration. Consequently, Schumpeter's claim is that one should expect to observe the highest R&D e¤ort under monopoly. The well known counter-argument formulated by Arrow is that a monopolist, being a¤ected by a replacement e¤ect, might rest on his laurels, being thus outperformed along the R&D dimension by any form of even slightly more competitive industry. An analogous, although not entirely equivalent version of the Arrow-Schumpeter debates relies on the relationship between …rms'investment incentives and the intensity of competition rather than industry structure. In this perspective, the Schumpeterian stance is that any factor decreasing …rms' pro…tability should shrink their incentive to invest, while the Arrovian position claims the opposite. The simplest way of formulating this alternative view of the issue at hand consists in taking the number of …rms (i.e., industry structure) as given and then assess the consequences of quantity versus price competition on innovation e¤orts.
Irrespective of the nature of innovation (either for cost reductions or for the introduction of new products), a large theoretical literature attains either Schumpeterian or Arrovian conclusions (for exhaustive accounts, see Tirole, 1988; Reinganum, 1989; and Martin, 2002) . 1 That is, partial equilibrium theoretical IO models systematically predict a monotone relationship between aggregate R&D e¤orts and industry structure, in either direction.
A completely di¤erent picture arises if one takes instead the standpoint of modern growth theory à la Aghion and Howitt (1998). In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) stress that empirical evidence shows a non-monotone relationship between industry concentration (or, the intensity of market competition) and aggregate R&D e¤orts: this takes the form of an inverted-U curve, at odds with all existing theoretical IO models; in the same paper, the authors provide a model yielding indeed such a concave result, and …tting the data. A thorough discussion, accompanied by an exhaustive review of the related lively debate, can be found in Aghion et al. (2013) .
One could say that the inverted-U emerging from data says that Arrow is right for small numbers, while Schumpeter is right thereafter. Alternatively, on the same basis one could also say that neither Arrow nor Schumpeter can match reality, if our interpretation of their respective views is that "competition (resp., monopoly) outperforms monopoly (resp., competition) along the R&D dimension." Be that as it may, there arises the need of constructing models delivering a non-monotone relationship between some form of investments in innovation, productive capacity or other relevant dimensions, and the number of …rms in the industry.
One such dimension is advertising expenditure. Nerlove and Arrow (1962) pointed out that advertising expenditure should be treated in the same way as investment in a durable good. They assumed that there is a stock of goodwill that determines the current level of market demand. This stock of goodwill incorporates the advertising carried out in the past and, like capital stock, depreciates over time. This has generated a large literature extending their seminal contributions in several directions, indeed too many to be summarised here (see, e.g., Feichtinger et Pauwels, 1977; Friedman, 1983; Fershtman, 1984; Erickson, 1995; Cellini and Lambertini, 2003a ,b, inter alia) and either disregard the in ‡uence of industry structure on aggregate advertising expenditure or …nd a monotone relationship.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic oligopoly model of advertising to revisit the discussion between Arrow and Schumpeter looking at the …rms' e¤orts to increase goodwill or brand equity. Firms are single-product units and sell di¤erentiated varieties of the same good, investing in advertising to increase goodwill over an in…nite horizon. Market competition takes place in outputs or prices, alternatively, and the game is fully noncooperative. All of this allows us to revisit the vexata quaestio of the relationship between investment incentives and market power/pro…tability in both the aforementioned ways. Our results can be spelled out as follows. First, the open-loop Nash equilibrium is strongly time consistent (i.e., subgame perfect) under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour. Second, the relationship between the equilibrium aggregate advertising expenditure and the number of …rms is concave and single-peaked, so that an inverted-U curve indeed arises, again irrespective of the market variable, provided that the degree of product dif-ferentiation is su¢ ciently high. Third, individual and aggregate advertising investments are higher in the Cournot setup then in the Bertrand one. Hence, under this respect, the ‡avour of the model is Schumpeterian.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The model is laid out in section 2. Section 3 investigates the game under quantity-setting behaviour, while price-setting behaviour is considered in section 4. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
The setup
Consider an industry existing over continuous time t 2 [0; 1) ; populated by a set N f1; 2; 3; :::ng of a priori fully symmetric single-product …rms. Each of them uses the same productive technology characterised by a constant marginal cost (normalised to zero for simplicity) to supply a di¤erentiated variety, whose instantaneous demand function is
where
is the instantaneous output of rivals and a > c and s 2 [0; 1] are constant parameters. In particular, s measures the degree of substitutability between any pair of varieties. In the special case s = 0, all varieties are independent of each other and all …rms behave as pure monopolists in N fully isolated markets. The inverse demand functions in (1) are for the Cournot (quantity-setting) game, while in the Bertrand (pricesetting) case one has to specify the direct demand system as follows:
The instantaneous pro…ts of the individual …rm are
where G i (t) is a state variable representing the goodwill or brand equity associated with variety i: Firm i's brand equity is (i) positively a¤ected by the advertising campaign, whose intensity is measured here by the instantaneous advertising e¤ort k i (t) ; entailing a cost i (t) = bk 2 i (t) ; b > 0; and (ii) negatively a¤ected by the rival's collective e¤ort K i (t) = P j6 =i K j (t) ; so that the state dynamics writes as follows:
in which parameter 2 [0; 1= (n 1)] scales the negative spillover e¤ect exerted by the n 1 rivals of …rm i, in such a way that if = 1= (n 1), the spillover neutralizes altogether …rm i's e¤ort. Parameter > 0 is the goodwill decay rate, assumed constant and common to all varieties. Also constant and symmetric across the whole population of …rms is taken to be the discount rate > 0:
Hence, each …rm has two controls, the advertising e¤ort and a market variable, either price or quantity, so that the game features n states and 2n controls. The objective of …rm i is to maximise the discounted pro…t ‡ow
subject to the set of dynamic constraints (4) and initial conditions G i0 = G i (0) > 0; plus the set of the appropriate transversality conditions to be speci…ed in the remainder. Independently of the market variable being set, …rms move simultaneously at all times, the solution concept being thus the Nash equilibrium under open-loop information. The reason for the choice of open-loop rules will become clear in the remainder.
The Cournot game
Under quantity-setting behaviour, the relevant demand structure is (1). As a result, the current-value Hamiltonian of …rm i is
where ij (t) = ij (t)e t is the costate variable (evaluated at time t) associated with the state variable G j (t) : We shall omit from now on the time argument when no ambiguity may arise. From (6) we can derive the …rst order conditions (FOCs) on controls:
and the set of co-state equations:
The accompanying set of transversality conditions is lim t!1 ij G j e t = 0 for all i; j = 1; 2; :::; n:
Before proceeding any further, note that (10) admits the solution ij = 0 at all times, and therefore (7) (8) (9) imply that the open-loop Nash solution is indeed subgame perfect as it is a degenerate feedback equilibrium. 4 More formally, we can formulate this result in the following: 5 Lemma 1 The open-loop information structure gives rise to a strongly time consistent equilibrium.
Then, we can impose symmetry across variables, thus rewriting (7-9) as
Now notice that (11) admits the quasi-static solution
replicating the static Cournot-Nash output (whence the subscript). Equations (12-13) can be manipulated to derive the control equation
so that, using = 2bk and (14), the dynamics of the advertising e¤ort is described by
which, together with
forms the state-control dynamic system of the present formulation of the game. Imposing stationarity on (16) (17) , we obtain the coordinates of the unique steady-state-equilibrium point
Note that G CN , which is non-negative for all admissible values of , corresponds to
The foregoing analysis can be summarised in
Proposition 2
The open-loop advertising game associated with Cournot competition produces a unique steady-state-equilibrium point at fG CN ; k CN ; q CN g ; which is subgame perfect.
Moreover, the stability analysis of the system (16-17) can be easily performed to prove: Proposition 3 The steady-state equilibrium fG CN ; k CN ; q CN g is a saddle point.
Proof. It su¢ ces to observe that the determinant of Jacobian matrix associated with the dynamic system (16-17) is = ( + ) < 0: We are now in a position to tackle the main issue we are interested with, namely, the shape of the equilibrium advertising e¤ort at the industry level, K CN = nk CN ; whose main features are captured by the following partial derivatives:
Solving @K CN =@n = 0; we have
in correspondence of which (21) is negative. Accordingly, we may claim Proposition 4 For all s 2 [0; 2=3] ; the aggregate advertising e¤ort K CN is concave and single-peaked in the number of …rms, taking its maximum at n CN = (2 s) =s 2:
The above result says that a su¢ ciently high degree of product di¤er-entiation delivers an inverted-U aggregate advertising e¤ort at equilibrium. This claim can be complemented by the ancillary observation that n CN = 1 in correspondence of s = 1; i.e., if products are perfect substitutes, then the model takes a Schumpeterian ‡avour, as it happens for all s 2 (2=3; 1]: if varieties are too little di¤erentiated, aggregate equilibrium investment decreases monotonically in the number of …rms.
The Bertrand game
Under price-setting behaviour, (2) replaces (1). The Hamiltonian function of …rm i is:
which generates the following set of necessary conditions:
with the same transversality conditions as above. Once again, (27) admits ij = 0 at all t 2 [0; 1) ; and the open-loop solution is strongly time consistent. Proceeding in the same manner as in the previous section, we obtain the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price
which collapses onto marginal cost if the good is homogeneous, and the control equation
which, together with (17), constitutes the state-control system relevant for the Bertrand case. The unique stationary point of the system (17-29) is
where G BN 0 is the level at which the goodwill trajectory
leads in steady state. It can be easily shown that (30) is a saddle point equilibrium (the proof is omitted for brevity).
The steady-state advertising e¤ort of the entire industry is K BN = nk BN ; whose partial derivative with respect to n is 
which can be treated geometrically, knowing that > 0 for all s 2 [0; 1) ; > 0 for all s 2 [0; 3=4) and negative elsewhere; and < 0 for all s 2 (1=2; 2=3) and positive elsewhere. The …rst step consists in observing that any n solving (34) also solves
so that the roots of @K BN =@n = 0 are identi…ed by the intersections of the following system:
i.e., the critical values of n, if they exist, are identi…ed by the intersections -if any -of the parabola y 1 and the hyperbola y 2 . First, observe that y 1 is convex for all s 2 (0; 1] ; moreover, y 1 = n 
i.e., in n = 1=2; which entails that y 1 is increasing for all n 1. Thirdly, y 2 > 0 for all s 2 (0; 1] and y 2 y 1 for all s 2 [0; 1=2] : Finally, @K BN =@nj n=1 = 1=4 irrespective of the value of s: The latter observation, in particular, entails that if a unique intersection does occur at some n N B 2; then it is a maximum point and we can disregard the sign of @ 2 K BN =@n 2 as it is surely negative. These properties jointly establish the following result:
Proposition 5 s 2 [0; 1=2] is a su¢ cient condition for @K BN =@n to be nil in correspondence of a unique number n N B 2:
In order to single out the necessary condition one must carry out some numerical calculations. It turns out that
and conversely in the complementary range of the key parameter s. Accordingly, we can formulate:
The parameter range wherein Bertrand behaviour generates an inverted-U-shaped aggregate advertising e¤ort at the steady state equilibrium is a proper subset of the range wherein Cournot behaviour yields the same result.
Hence, under both quantity-and price-setting behaviour, there emerges an inverted-U curve describing aggregate investment in goodwill at the steadystate equilibrium provided di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently high. Accordingly, one can say that the concave shape of industry investments is robust to a change in market variables. However, the requirement on the level of product di¤erentiation is milder in the Cournot model, intuitively because -Cournot competition being less aggressive, and consequently its pro…ts higher than Bertrand's -quantity-setting behaviour more easily allow for the balance between the competitive e¤ect (Schumpeter) and the replacement e¤ect (Arrow) to ‡ip over at some n > 1.
As a last step, we may compare aggregate steady state investments to …nd that
So, if one interprets the Schumpeterian hypothesis in the sense that any reduction in the intensity of competition must be expected to foster investments, for example by choosing quantity-setting rather than price-setting strategies for any degree of substitutability, then (40) shows that Schumpeter was right:
Proposition 7 Cournot competition enhances equilibrium individual and collective advertising e¤orts as compared to Bertrand competition. The resulting individual and collective amount of goodwill is higher under quantity-setting behaviour.
The explanation appears to be that since quantity strategies are less aggressive than price strategies, and the corresponding gross pro…ts react accordingly, a fully Schumpeterian argument applies: the size of pro…ts definitely matter. There remain to be assessed the consequences on social welfare, which are however intuitive and can be quickly dealt with, since the above proposition clearly implies that welfare is higher under Bertrand competition (welfare -gross of advertising costs -is higher under Bertrand competition; hence, a fortiori, it is higher than that generated by Cournot after subtracting total advertising costs).
Concluding remarks
We have characterised the e¤ects of industry structure and market competition on individual and aggregate advertising e¤orts in a di¤erential oligopoly game in which …rms sell di¤erentiated varieties of the same good. Irrespective of whether …rms are quantity-or price-setting agents, an inverted Ushaped aggregate investment curve emerges at equilibrium, if varieties are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated. This is in line with recent empirical and theoretical results (Aghion et al., 2005) shedding new light on the long-standing debate between Schumpeter and Arrow. A Schumpeterian ‡avour instead characterises the bearings of market competition on individual and aggregate advertising expenditure, as the latter is higher under Cournot competition, for any industry structure.
Appendix
What follows illustrates the feedback solution of the game in which …rms set output levels. Observe that each player's payo¤ and dynamics depend only on her own goodwill. (There is of course an indirect dependence through the control variables of the other players.) Denote by V i (G i ) the value function of player i. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of this player reads as follows:
(a1) Assuming an interior solution, from the necessary conditions for optimality taking the partial derivatives of the RHS in (a1) with respect to q i and k i and equating to zero, we obtain:
The …rst condition shows that the quantities are strategic substitutes, that is, @q i =@q j < 0, which is a feature of Cournot model. The second condition states that advertising strategy is determined by the familiar rule of marginal cost (2bk i ) being equal to marginal bene…t, measured by the marginal value of goodwill V 0 i (G i ). As the model's parameters are identical for all players, it is intuitively appealing to look for a symmetric equilibrium. The ensuing analysis shows that the solution of the HJB equation (a1) indeed delivers the same outcome as the open-loop formulation of the same problem investigated in the main text.
Assume G i (t) 6 = 0 for all i 2 N and all t 2 [0; 1). In a symmetric equilibrium, q i = q; k i = k and G i = G for all i 2 N . We conjecture that the value function of player i is linear and given by V (G) = C + DG. The equilibrium conditions (a2-a3) become
Inserting (a4-a5) in (a1) yields
By identi…cation, we have
C = a 4 (1 2 (n 1))
Using k = D= (2b), we obtain k = a 2 2b ( + ) (2 + s (n 1))
The value function is linear and given by V CN (G) = a 1. The analysis of the feedback game has been carried out under the assumptions that the solution is interior, which obviously holds true, and the goodwill stock is never equal to zero. Substituting for the advertising strategies in the goodwill dynamics and solving the di¤erential equation yields the trajectory G CN (t) = e t G 0 + a 2 (1 (n 1) ) 2b ( + ) (2 + s (n 1)) 2 1 e t : (a11)
Under our speci…cation that 2 [0; 1= (n 1)] ;we clearly have G (t) 0 for all t 2 [0; 1). The steady-state value is given by G CN = a 2 (1 (n 1) ) 2b ( + ) (2 + s (n 1)) 2 > 0:
2. The result that the quantity and advertising strategies are independent of the state (i.e., constant or degenerate feedback) is surprising. Indeed, we would have expected this to occur if the di¤erential game were of the linear-state variety, but this is not the case here. (In fact, the game is not even linear quadratic). This result has surely something to do with two facts: (i) the other players'state variables do not appear in each player's optimization problem; and (ii) the multiplicative form in G of the revenue function. In any event, with constant strategies, we conclude that open-loop and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria coincide. Interestingly, this implies that the characterization of the entire industry's advertising e¤ort is indeed independent of the information structure.
The feedback solution of the Bertrand game con…rms the same conclusions reached in the Cournot setting (namely, that the open-loop equilibrium is a degenerate feedback one) and is omitted for brevity.
